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The Brazilian and Peruvian Amazon Rainforests host some of the most biodiverse habitats in the 
world which hold present and future monetary and intrinsic value to local and international 
communities. However, they are threatened by high rates of deforestation. The REDD+ Program 
by the UN provides compensation for the preservation of developing countries’ forest stocks. 
While beneficial, many rural and indigenous citizens are negatively affected by REDD+ due to 
job loss tied to deforestation reduction and tenure issues. This can lead to illegal, increased 
deforestation rates. The REDD+ payment allocations are regulated through a system of seven 
“Safeguards”, essentially policies. While a few current Safeguards address rural and indigenous 
people, the Safeguards are relatively ambiguous and may not be effective when implemented in a 
developing economy with possible political corruption. By improving the current Safeguards and 
more heavily monitoring payment distribution, REDD+ can be more effective. Two alternatives 
to consider are implications with indigenous and rural land tenures and potential financial gains 
from cultural Intellectual Property rights. 
 




 The Amazon is one of the most biodiverse environments on the planet. An assumed 
minimum of 10% of global biodiversity lives within the Amazon Rainforest (Rodrigues, 2013). 
The Amazon Rainforest itself lies over several different countries, with the largest portions being 
in Brazil and Peru respectively. Many species of animals and plants residing within the Amazon 
have not been scientifically classified. For this reason, the value of preserving biodiversity is 
very difficult to quantify, as the benefits are largely unknown (Daly 2000). However, there are 
many possible benefits such as pharmaceutical profits, epidemic prevention, and intrinsic value 
preservation, among others.  
Deforestation is one of the largest threats to biodiversity in these regions. Deforestation 
and the subsequent forest degradation account for 17% of global carbon emissions (United 
Nations, 2019). An increasing global interest towards climate change mitigation has led to 
incentives to stop deforestation and preserve forest stock. This necessitates interventions such as 
the REDD+ program, which intrinsically also have massive benefits for biodiversity protection. 
The REDD+ program (which stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries) is a UN program which aims to connect funds from 
stakeholders in developed countries with an interest in mitigating climate change to governments 
in developing countries that have high rates of deforestation. The stakeholders (typically 
developed nations, although could be NGOs and nonprofits) then pay the developing countries 
for improved carbon stocks, which has been shown to slow rates of climate change advancement. 
However, these programs can often overlook the impacts they have to rural and indigenous 
populations, which are often the most affected by the policy decisions, and also who have the 
greatest chance of causing a country to be excluded from the program due to high illegal 
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deforestation rates (Andersson et al., 2018). By spending more time matching funds to rural and 
indigenous people, countries can reach greater efficiencies in the program as well as potentially 
seeing longer lasting benefits.  
 This paper will examine how the current REDD+ system lacks sufficient regulations for 
benefit allocation requirements for indigenous and rural people, as well as how the current 
Safeguards can be improved in order to better help those negatively affected by REDD+. Current 
REDD+ endeavors have been criticized and have been publicly opposed by both local and rural 
citizens. One of the biggest ambiguities for REDD+ legislation is insecure land tenures which 
leads to confusion among distribution and unequal division of benefits (Larson et al., 2013). 
Historically, agreements with indigenous people and international agencies and companies can 
cause short-term harm while payments and benefits take several years to be enacted (King et al., 
1996).  
 REDD+ guidelines are well-defined as far as distribution and risk among stakeholders. 
However, the actual process and guideline for benefit sharing among different demographics in 
REDD+ countries has not been clearly defined (Torpey-Saboe et al., 2015). As ecosystem and 
climate change mitigation-based incentives become more prevalent in developing countries, “co-
benefits”, most notably sustainable development goals as well as local costs are expected to be 
considered (Sills et al., 2017). One study found that wealth inequality was directly linked with 
high levels of tenure insecurity and that wealthier individuals tend to receive more benefits than 
poor citizens. In this study, external benefits were found to benefit poorer individuals which 
lends hope that programs such as REDD+ can still benefit rural and poorer populations (King et 
al., 1996). Part of the issue with establishing benefit sharing guidelines is the definition of what 
constitutes a “benefit”. The definition of what constitutes a benefit ranges from direct cash 
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benefits to development assistance (Luttrell et al., 2013). For this paper, benefits will be 
restricted to economic stimulus, infrastructure improvement, rural job security, and land titling 
and tenure, non-market benefits as well as costs will not currently be considered. 
2. Current Situation 
2.1 Biodiversity in the Amazon 
There are many reasons for the economic value of preserving biodiversity. The field of 
pharmaceuticals relies on the discovery of “new” chemical compounds, found in these largely 
unexplored but biodiverse areas in plants and fungi. This could clearly lead to financial benefit 
and the ever increasing push for the valuation of the intrinsic aspect of biodiversity, most 
especially when species recognition may not have occurred, such as in many areas of the 
Amazon (Tupper 2009). Deforestation threatens biodiversity as clearcutting results in 
destructions of habitat niches, which could potentially wipe out an entire species. While 
deforestation may affect certain species more so than others, it has a clear negative effect on 
overall biodiversity, which makes program that focus on climate change mitigation also 
beneficial for biodiversity preservation, so long as they reduce clearcutting (for further 
ecological analysis and significance see Appendix A).  
2.2 Land Tenure and Associated Issues 
 Land tenure and land use policies are convoluted in developing countries. In the 
particular case of the Amazon, this is more prevalent in the Peruvian portion of the Amazon. 
Land use issues can be observed across many sectors (Alston et al. 1999). One such example is 
the rise in palm oil production. The rise in demand for palm oil has led to a push for cultivation 
and production of palm oil which has resulted in clear cutting in many tropical areas. Those most 
affected in terms of land tenure are smallholders. These citizens can have informal land rights, 
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which are easily revoked. In some cases, even well-defined land tenure agreements are often in 
jeopardy of losing their land in favor of large corporate cultivation, which is often 
governmentally endorsed. Tenants are also more at risk if they do not support the cultivation of 
the crop of the moment, which in this case is palm oil (Bennett et al., 2018). Land tenure disputes 
have historically and are currently occurring in the Peruvian Amazon in regards to rights 
between indigenous citizens and those of oil companies (Orta-Martinez et al., 2018). There are 
many reasons why land tenure issues may impede REDD+ goals, however two main 
impediments include ambiguous responsibility of forest custodianship and an inability to make 
property excludable to deforesting entities (Sunderlin 2014). 
 Land tenure and titling include a bundle of various rights, which can be ambiguous or 
completely undefined in countries such as Peru and Brazil. Rights to forest products are rarely 
defined and land tenures rarely formally include harvesting rights (Brown et al. 2008). 
Harvesting rights, essentially the designation of using cropland/forest areas for the cultivation of 
specific crops, are unclearly defined. This leads to smallholders being harmed as large 
corporations can overtake the majority of an area and stake claim to products (Torpey-Saboe et 
al., 2015). Clarity on tenure and harvest rights has been highlighted as a flaw within the current 
REDD+ system. The current ambiguity lends to disadvantages for smallholders and has to be 
addressed at both a local and national level (Sunderlin et al., 2015). While this is not of direct 
concern to the REDD+ Program, vague property rights can lead to ambiguities in benefit 
distribution. Whether more defined land rights should be a stipulation for whether a country is 
allowed to participate, or whether this issue is outside of the scope and incentives of the REDD+ 
Program, it clearly is an issue that needs to be addressed in order to make REDD+ more 
successful.  
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 Land tenure issues are often an issue in developing countries due to various governmental 
issues. Some of the instability found within developing countries leads to serious issues such as 
those with land tenure. Other issues that arise are due to things such as high poverty and wealth 
disparities, government corruption, and instability (Blackman et al., 2008). These governmental 
issues can result in problems such as unfulfilled promises, insecure funding, and private 
pocketing of funds that were allocated for public use. These are some of the key issues which 
REDD+ faces. 
2.2 Indigenous People 
 Indigenous people are not the target of REDD+ incentives, but are clearly an intrinsic 
aspect of the REDD+ program, as the people most affected by land use changes are typically in 
areas populated by rural and indigenous peoples. These communities often do not have say in 
what is occurring in programs such as RED+. For example, communities in the REDD+ 
Programs in the Ucayali region of Peru largely consist of indigenous people of the Shipibo 
Conibo communities (Rodriguez-Ward & del Aguila, 2014). While REDD+ representatives 
gather the input of these citizens and try to respond to concerns, there are many issues, such as 
job market improvements without deforestation and the market losses that these local markets 
will see without the added revenue streams from those employed through deforestation, which 
remain unaddressed. The initiative looked at development factors such as education, agriculture, 
and infrastructure, however it did not directly address how the local economy may be directly 
impacted and how to mitigate these impacts (Coombe 1998). This illustrates how although 
indigenous people are considered and included in the Safeguards, there is still a plethora of 
ambiguity and issues with the way indigenous-specific issues are identified and addressed.  
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 Developing countries can often overlook the needs of the indigenous and rural people, 
often because of the disparity between the levels of wealth in these countries. However, these 
populations are key part of the success of these initiatives. If the rural and indigenous 
populations are not compensated for damages, they have no motivation to not continue lowering 
levels of deforestation (Cromberg et al. 2014). While the large scale deforestation operations will 
likely be reduced because of participation in the program, if clearcutting for sustaining activities 
such as agriculture and timber happen on a wide enough scale in rural and indigenous 
communities, it could cause a participating country to not be able to receive their payments for 
the year and could ultimately lead to their REDD+ program being discontinued. From a United 
Nations perspective, improving the Safeguards for improved indigenous and rural benefits 
should be a priority, as indigenous as well as general human rights are some of the important 
principles which drive UN actions and programs. 
2.3 REDD+ Current Operations & Distributions 
 As stated earlier, REDD+ stands for “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries” and focuses on carbon sequestration for climate change 
mitigation. The program was created to help establish a framework for connecting funds from 
parties interested in climate change reduction and countries with large forest stocks. The idea is 
that deforestation causes significant greenhouse gas emissions and that by reducing the amount 
of trees, the amount of carbon dioxide which can be sequestered by the forest is thus reduced. 
The program is reliant upon seven Safeguards which act as rules to be abided by in the 
participating countries and the developing country must report its compliance through data 
collection in a Safeguard Information System (SIS) which is available to the UN and 
stakeholders (United Nations 2018). 
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 REDD+ has, to date, around 320 million USD in commitments and around 310 million 
USD in deposits, although this is not representative of the whole program as it can also act as a 
framework and directly connect funds with developing countries. The rate at which these funds 
are growing has begun to slow in the last five years, however the accounts are still seeing 
positive change. Currently, both Brazil and Peru have active REDD+ programs. The allocation of 
funds which is received by each country is determined by the tons of Carbon dioxide which are 
prevented from emission and/or sequestered (United Nations 2018). While Brazil has been 
utilizing REDD+ Programs for much longer, the Peruvian REDD+ Programs have a longer 
projection into future values. Because each country develops their own SIS this could be due to a 
lack of reporting and is not necessarily significant. Currently, both Brazil and Peru are receiving 
payments directly from Norway. 
Currently REDD+ still has a lot of ambiguities in terms of required benefit sharing 
structures. REDD+ has seven Safeguards in place (Duchelle et al., 2014). These Safeguards 
address several issues including indigenous peoples and sufficient planning and regulation; 
however the Safeguards are very vague and leave space for misunderstanding (see Table 1 for 
Safeguards as well as explanations of successes and failures within each). 
2.4 Operations Similar to REDD+ 
 REDD+ is not a pioneering program for setting up payment or benefit systems for 
ecosystem services. There have been several other companies or programs which have attempted 
to provide compensation in exchange for decreased deforestation rates (among a variety of other 
ecosystem services), some to a much greater success than others. These can help to provide 
insight into ways in which REDD+ can be improved in order to maximize the overall benefits. 
Two such projects which will be examined include a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
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project in Vittel, France and an Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Red de Proteccion Social 
in Nicaragua. 
 The PES project of Vittel (a French component of Nestlé Waters) is an example of a 
project which successfully utilized a PES scheme in order to mitigate an environmental issue. In 
this particular case, farmers were incentivized to change agricultural practices in order to lower 
nitrate levels in the water supply. The process of reaching a functioning outcome took a total of 
ten years. The program largely relies on a strong public-private partnership which allows farmers 
to receive benefits while Vittel can maintain the water quality which they desire. The overall 
satisfaction in varying demographics as well as environmental benefits resulting from the 
program are thought to be rooted in the transparency of the program and the trust that was built 
in the public-private partnership (Perrot-Maître, 2006). 
 The Vittel and other PES projects have some distinguishing features. For example, this 
endeavor was privately funded, and while having environmental benefits, also had a strong profit 
driven motive (assurance of safe water for corporate sales). PES projects are rather diverse and 
there is not necessarily one system or way of conducting the payments. This variability is largely 
the reason that some projects are successes and some are failures. This system really only 
necessitates that a private entity receives payments for the preservation and/or restoration of an 
ecosystem service (clean water, carbon sequestration, etc.). Another large issue with PES is the 
fact that PES typically requires total participation but since it is privately funded (most often), 
the likelihood of “hold outs” is much higher and can greatly impact the desired results (Wunder 
et al. 2008). Additionally, because it is privately funded it does not necessarily need to consider 
every possible effected party and the Vittel PES occurred in a country with already strict 
environmental standards (although there have been other successful PES programs in developing 
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countries). Overall, the PES system relies on common goals between all parties and a system of 
trust and transparency to be successful. However, the scale of this project was significantly 
smaller than that of REDD+ and relied upon private funding of a relatively low amount. 
 The Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) in Nicaragua 
are another example of a system of distributing benefits, but in this case it is a tiered system in 
which citizens are paid based upon their action (in this case more socially based instead of 
environmentally based). This particular project is much broader than the Vittel program. The 
program is also much more organized and structured. A CCT relies on the actions of citizens or 
organizations to be completed in a specific way in order to receive the cash incentive (García-
Amado et al., 2013). In this example, the cash incentive was distributed to impoverished citizens 
based off of markers such as school attendance and healthcare monitoring. 
 One of the interesting aspects of the RPS is the fact that the program works in phases. 
The payments first go to some of the poorest members of the country (typically rural citizens) 
through targeted demographics. These citizens receive financial compensation which helps short 
term poverty reduction while also slowly building up local government and infrastructure to 
ensure long term success and poverty control (Maluccio & Flores, 2005). While the RPS 
program focuses on social development and not environmental benefit, it still is applicable to 
environmental situations and has many innovative aspects. 
3.  Policy Proposal 
 The current issues which the lack of enforcement of benefit distribution have produced  
could be largely fixed through amendments to the current Safeguards. These changes can still 
prevent deforestation but more thoughtfully consider impacts to rural and indigenous citizens of 
the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazons. While the Safeguards probably have room for 
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improvements throughout, the two Safeguards which have the most room for improvements and 
potential impacts for benefit distribution changes are Safeguard 3 and Safeguard 4. 
Currently, Safeguards 3 reads, “Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous 
peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international 
obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General 
Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
(United Nations, 2019).  While this Safeguard includes indigenous people, it is rather vague and 
does not include many specifics about obligations that a REDD+ country has in regards to 
benefit sharing. This should be amended to add at the end of the Safeguard, “Any transaction or 
indirect costs to indigenous and rural citizens directly from REDD+ benefits need to be valuated 
and compensated for, either directly through REDD+ funds or through other domestic benefits”, 
as well as adding clarifying language (see Table 1). These additions force REDD+ countries to 
look at potential job loss, transaction costs, and any other costs which may affect indigenous or 
rural people and to provide just compensation. This is arguably the most important change that is 
needed. By adding a stipulation that a valuation of damages for rural and indigenous people must 
be performed and compensated for, Brazil and Peru are forced to address these benefit allocation 
issues. 
Safeguard #4 reads, “The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in 
particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 
and 72 of this decision” (United Nations, 2019). Paragraph 70 refers to which activities should 
be undertaken in order to mitigate emissions and manage forest stocks, and paragraph 72 refers 
to addressing drivers of deforestation (including land tenure issues). The suggested change for 
this Safeguard would be that participation be replaced with “majority consent”. Currently, 
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indigenous and rural communities are only allowed to be at the table and not to have a real voice 
in issues. By calling for a majority consent (most likely decided upon by a vote of 
representatives from the effected communities), rural and indigenous peoples are able to have a 
say in the decisions that will largely be affecting them. This is also important, as communities 
which largely oppose REDD+ regulations could be ones which heavily rely upon deforestation 
and would continue illegally deforesting after the program started. 
4. Economic Rationale 
4.1 Modeling Marginal Costs and Marginal Benefits 
 When deciding whether the effort of spending the extra time, energy and resources on 
matching funds to rural and indigenous people is “worth” the additional effort, it is important to 
look at associated benefits. When considering the benefits which indigenous and rural citizens 
are obtaining, this is seen through compensation for damages, or, in some cases, possibly 
avoidance of an additional REDD+ program when damages seem to be too significant. The main 
issue within the current Safeguard system is that it fails to have a component which requires a 
valuation of damages done to rural and indigenous population be required. This would mean that 
whenever a REDD+ program occurs in a rural or indigenous community, the impacts related 
directly or indirectly to REDD+ actions such as job loss, infrastructure deterioration, etc. must be 
quantified and the proposal for the allocation of benefits must include how distribution will make 
up for the damages. There’s a variety of ways in which these damages can be mitigated. Whether 
through direct fund transfers, property titles, infrastructure improvements, etc., there must be a 
quantifiable benefit value which matches or exceeds that of the damages related to REDD+.  
 Currently, the amount of time that is spent on REDD+ does not seem to be at an optimal 
point. The marginal cost of distributing additional benefits to rural and indigenous citizens 
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experienced by the country participating in a REDD+ program is at a steady slope. A certain 
amount of cost is most likely to be fixed, then the cost will rise as additional communities are 
reached since many of these communities are remote and difficult to reach as well as the fact that 
a consensus for REDD+ to even occur in these areas may be more difficult to reach. There also 
are marginal benefits which are decreasing at a slower rate. The marginal benefit will initially be 
quite high as accounting more closely for the damages seen in these communities will at first be 
quite impactful then it will slowly start to diminish, as it is more likely that the initial benefits 
will be more substantial and the longer that is spent on distribution, the more likely it is that an 
agent is spending a significant amount of time trying to distribute a smaller amount of benefits, 
making out marginal benefits decrease over time. 
 The natural equilibrium of these two curves would result in a substantial number of hours 
being used for distributing benefits to rural and indigenous citizens, however this is not the 
situation that is occurring. A quite small number of hours is being spent on looking at benefit 
distribution (or time spent matching funds). For this reason, there must be some type of 
constraint on the system which is causing the equilibrium of hours spent matching funds to not 
settle at the point where marginal costs equals marginal benefits; this can be observed in Figure 
1. This constraint can be called the Developing Country Constraint (or CDC). This constraint 
results from a variety of issues – most significantly, corruption within the governments of 
developing countries which causes funds to be misdirected as well as a significant disparity 
between the wealthy and poor citizens (often found in rural and indigenous communities). 
 By adding the Safeguard revisions, this constraint can be relaxed. When the developing 
countries must consider the welfare of the rural and indigenous people, the system will move to 
its natural equilibrium where marginal costs is equal to marginal benefits (Figure 2). This will 
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allow the optimal number of hours spent on matching funds to be met. This allows the original 
area that represented a deadweight loss to now be representative of captured benefits. 
The Safeguard revisions also could possibly cause shifts to either the marginal benefits 
curve, marginal cost curve, or both. If the regulations are changed such that communities that 
would experience large damages under REDD+ regulation are taken off the table along with 
general consideration of the needs of these communities could lead to an outward shift of the 
marginal demand curve (Figure 3), which would result in additional benefits (shown by the blue 
area). There also is a chance that the marginal cost curve could shift as well as decrease in slope. 
If a better system for evaluating and compensating for indigenous and rural needs is created, this 
could help the process be more efficient and lead to a downward shift for the marginal cost 
curve.  Because the UN helps establish Safeguard Information Systems and helps countries with 
efficiency, the added regulations could mean that the country could be more efficient in spending 
its resources which would lead to a decreased slope in the marginal benefits curve (Figure 4). 
This shift would also lead to additional captured benefits (seen in the orange area). If both of this 
shifts are observed simultaneously, the blue and oange additional benefits would both be 
observed as well as  
4.2 Areas of Concern 
 As with any policy proposal, there are potential issues which may arise with the 
suggested changes. In regards to the policy proposal regarding Safeguard #3, there are a few 
potential issues. Valuation of costs to local and indigenous peoples can add cost to the project, 
potentially slow the project down, and in the case of extremely high costs, may ultimately stop 
the project. However, if a project has high enough costs for indigenous and rural peoples that it 
outweighs the benefit, perhaps it should not be enacted.  
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 In regards to the policy change to Safeguard 4, there are also a few things that could 
potentially go awry. For example, if local communities are choosing to dissent to the decision 
not because of high costs but because of an ethical or other difference, this can potentially slow 
the momentum of REDD+ and lead to more deforestation. In addition, how a representative is 
chosen and which communities should get to vote in each issues also needs to be considered. 
5. Policy Alternatives 
 There are alternatives to the proposed Safeguards which could also help mitigate 
REDD+ damages to rural and indigenous people. One prominent alternative would be the 
increase of titling of land to indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples in both Brazil and Peru are 
stuck in ambiguity as they live on federally or state owned lands. These peoples often have 
formed very sustainable land management practices due to the fact that they have been reliant on 
the land for such a long time, that they have learned how to take but also give as far as natural 
resources are concerned. By titling land to indigenous people, both the instances of clear cutting 
as well as general disturbances decrease (Blackman et al., 2017). There are two clear possible 
ways which this could be incorporated into the REDD+ Program. The stipulation that a certain 
number of acres per certain amount of funding be titled to indigenous people could be added to 
Safeguard 3 “Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local 
communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances 
and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (United Nations, 2019). By adding this 
stipulation in, developing countries would be held responsible for aiding indigenous peoples 
while also still reducing overall deforestation and emissions from deforestation. Additionally, 
this could be addressed by a REDD+ specific program (or similar program by the UN) which 
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titles land to indigenous people in direct exchange for valued carbon sequestration/emission 
reduction benefits. While this method has the advantage of removing the intermediary of the 
developing countries’ government, it poses specific problems. Most especially, the timeline for 
adding a UN funded program or a new sector to the REDD+ program could be inefficient due to 
the fact that deforestation is often a time sensitive issue. Carbon here, row crop agriculture, 
“plow print”, areas that could be at risk for  
Indigenous practices are quickly becoming commonplace in western society as interest in 
homeopathic and natural cures and remedies are sought. These practices have often been used for 
hundreds of years by indigenous people and even often require specific herbs, plants, fungi, etc. 
from the region. One such example can be seen in Ayahuasca. This is a traditional drink of 
certain indigenous people of the Amazon region. The drink is an entheogen, so it causes 
psychoactive responses in the body. Traditionally used for healing and ceremonies, it’s slowly 
becoming more widely spread across Brazil and is an increasingly common draw for tourists 
(Tupper 2009). The increase of this practice is just one example of indigenous practices in which 
intellectual property rights may come into play. This however can be tricky to exactly implement 
and make profitable.  
There are many other examples outside of Ayahuasca where the potential for cultural 
intellectual property rights may be claimed. The practice of taking indigenous knowledge and 
practice and using it for corporate gain without financial compensation is known as biopiracy 
(Tupper 2009). Although this act has largely been overlooked and not viewed as a criminal act, it 
is gaining attention as requiring a just compensation to the indigenous people from where the 
knowledge originates. The benefits that some pharmaceutical companies are offering include a 
long-term and short term reciprocal benefits, which can consist of immediate aid and financial 
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assistance as well as profits for the medicine as it becomes commercial. However, this strategy 
may not be as reliable. Some companies who have attempted this such as Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals have ended up folding (King et al. 1996). 
One benefit of this approach is that as biodiversity decreases, the value of these IP rights 
rapidly increases (Brush, 1993). Most cases have at least some legal backing and precedent for 
financial claims to indigenous knowledge. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights, which are two separate entities which help provide legal 
foundation for indigenous knowledge intellectual property rights (Coombe 1998). This use of 
Intellectual Property rights can be incorporated into REDD+ regulations, also through a revision 
of the third Safeguard. By requiring countries to support and help facilitate IP laws and rights 
claims for their indigenous people, current REDD+ practices can be managed while adding 
benefits for indigenous peoples. 
These alternatives could also provide solutions to the current REDD+ issues, however 
they still have flaws. The biggest problem with both proposed alternatives is that while they help 
the indigenous populations, they do little to nothing for rural populations who are also affected 
negatively by REDD+ implementations. In addition, these regulations could be much more 
difficult to enforce than the proposed policy solution. 
6. Conclusions 
 REDD+ has potential to mitigate emissions and negative impacts of deforestation such as 
biodiversity loss; however, there are many effects to rural and indigenous citizens which must be 
considered in order for the program to be socially and environmentally sound. In addition to this 
moral reasoning, the program may end up failing due to illegal deforestation if these populations 
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are not compensated for losses that they experience from direct and indirect damages done by 
implementing REDD+ programs. While there are many issues which could be addressed within 
the Safeguard system, the most pressing alterations that need to be done are to Safeguards 3 and 
4. These changes would allow for a greater voice to be given to indigenous and rural people 
which could allow for more close and transparent collaboration in turn providing higher welfare 
to rural and indigenous people as well as increasing the overall success as well as the longevity 
of the program. 
6. Further Research 
 Moving forward, there is further research and actions which would allow the overall 
success of the program to be greater. Firstly, to test the new Safeguards (most importantly the 
implementation of a damage valuation as well as the mechanics of a community voting on 
consent of implementation of the program), a pilot program would need to be create. Both Brazil 
and Peru have sites which could be ideal for this type of testing. Moving forward, other related 
topics which could be examined include – effectiveness of benefits for rural and indigenous 
people of varying communities within one nation as well as the similarities and differences of 
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Tables and Figures 
Safeguard Definition Target Successes/Failures 
1 That actions complement or are 
consistent with the objectives of 
national forest programmes and 
relevant international conventions 
and agreements 
Harmony between 
UN and regional or 
national programs 
This is mostly successful in 
cohesion within state and UN. 
2 Transparent and effective national 
forest governance structures, taking 





This is effective in helping to 
mitigate some issues with 
corruption but still leaves many 
issues unaddressed. 
3 Respect for the knowledge and rights 
of indigenous peoples and members 
of local communities, by taking into 
account relevant international 
obligations, national circumstances 
and laws, and noting that the United 
Nations General Assembly has 
adopted the United Nations 




This is effective in at least 
bringing about the significance.  
3R Respect for the knowledge and 
intellectual as well as physical 
property rights of indigenous 
peoples and members of local, 
especially susceptible rural, 
communities, by taking into account 
relevant international obligations, 
national circumstances and laws, and 
noting that the United Nations 
General Assembly has adopted the 
United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A 
valuation of impacts needs to be 
done and actions need to 
compensate for this. 
Protect rural and 
indigenous people 
Ideally this will allow for 
indigenous and rural people to be 
justly compensated for the 
damages that they may have 
observed by implementing 
REDD+ programs in their 
communities. 
4 The full and effective participation of 
relevant stakeholders, in particular 
indigenous peoples and local 
communities, in the actions referred 






This is effective in making sure 
that community members are at 
the table but it doesn’t necessarily 
mean that they have a say in the 
process. 
4R The full and effective participation 
and majority consent of relevant 
stakeholders, in particular all 
indigenous peoples and local 
communities affected by REDD+ 
regulation changes, in the actions 





This regulation would enable 
communities to essentially deny 
efforts that will cause large 
amounts of harm to their 
community. 
Table 1 (continued next page) 
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5 That actions are consistent with the 
conservation of natural forests and 
biological diversity, ensuring that the 
actions referred to in paragraph 70 of 
this decision are not used for the 
conversion of natural forests, but are 
instead used to incentivize the 
protection and conservation of 
natural forests and their ecosystem 
services, and to enhance other social 
and environmental benefits, taking 
into account the need for sustainable 
livelihoods of indigenous peoples and 
local communities and their 
interdependence on forests in most 
countries, reflected in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, as well as the 




accounting for social 
issues. 
This does a good job of ensuring 
the environmental goals of the 
program, helping to prevent 
biodiversity loss. Somewhat 
effective in protecting indigenous 
rights, but again, quite vague. 
6 Actions to address the risks of 
reversals 
Prevent reversals Mostly effective but vague, does 
not provide a clear basis for 
evaluation. 





Overall effective, however 
displacement of emissions from 
producers who are left without 
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 Biodiversity can apply to all aspects of life, including bacteria, fungi, plants, and animals. 
Deforestation can often change the biodiversity of an area through habitat loss and land use 
change. One such example is that clearcutting for agriculture has largely led to a decreased level 
of biodiversity within soil communities in the Amazon (Rodrigues, 2013). While this may not 
immediately seem like a pressing issue, due to the moisture and warmth of the tropics, the soil 
communities are typically teeming with life. These bacteria and fungi living in the soil often 
serve very important functions and often have symbiotic relationships with local flora. Through 
biodiversity reduction, not only the soil community is affected but also the plant community. 
This in turn can affect animal consumers and thus an entire chain of life is affected. 
 The Amazon is one of the most important areas in terms of biodiversity. This area is 
thought to contain roughly ten percent of global biodiversity (essentially of all known species in 
the world, ten percent reside within the Amazon). Most of the deforestation done in this area is 
done through clearcutting, the method with the highest environmental impacts. Clearcutting 
destroys entire habitats and has the possibility of destroying whole species populations (Hopkins 
2007). While there are many reasons for reducing the rates of deforestation in the Amazon, 
biodiversity is one of the most compelling, as much of the importance of biodiversity is not yet 
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